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ABSZXACT: The life-cycle theory of saving behavior (Modigliani, 1988) suggests 
that humans strive towards an equal intertemporal distribution of wealth. However, 
behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposes that people use self- 
control heuristics to postpone wealth until later in life. According to this theory, people 
use a system of cognitive budgeting known as mental accounting. In the present study 
it was found that mental accounts were used differently depending on if the income 
change was positive or negative. This was shown both in a representative nationwide 
sample of households and in a student sample. Respondents were more willing to cut 
down on their propensity to consume when faced with an income decrease than to raise 
it when the income increased. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of behavioral 
life-cycle theory, it was found that the respondents adjusted their propensity to con- 
sume the most when the income increases or decreases took place immediately. Hence, 
it is suggested that theories of intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein, 1988; Loewen- 
stein & Prelec, 1992) provide a better account of the data than does the behavioral life- 
cycle theory. 
Several models of household saving behavior have been proposed during this cen- 
tury (e.g., Becker, 1976; Friedman, 1957; Keynes, 1936). As was discussed by 
Winnet and Lewis (1995), one of the most general may be the life-cycle theory 
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(Modigliani, 1988). In this theory it is implied that people strive towards uniform 
consumption during the life cycle. Thus people take loans when their income is 
low because they expect a higher income in the future. On the other hand they 
save when the income is higher than expected. However, empirical observations 
have indicated that current income may be a more important factor than the theory 
predicts. For instance, Courant, Gramlich, and Laitner (1986) report that middle- 
aged households have a higher degree of consumption than younger and older 
households. To shed further light on this issue, it is important to study how con- 
sumption decisions are affected by income changes. 
Behavioral life-cycle theory was proposed by Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992). 
According to this theory, the current income is of greater importance for con- 
sumption than would be predicted from the life-cycle theory. Specifically, this 
alternative theory attempts to explain why people are unwilling to borrow money 
when they have a low income. It is argued that people act as if they use three dif- 
ferent mental accounts, current spendable income (I), current assets (A), and 
future income (F). The theory assumes that people are more willing to use the cur- 
rent spendable income for consumption than current assets and more willing to 
use current assets than future income, that is, if C is consumption, 
1 = &Z&U > r3CIaA > XIDF = 0. (1) 
The notion of mental accounts implies that any present or future unit of wealth is 
not necessarily exchangeable. Thus, the principle of fungibility (McCloskey, 
1987) which is basic to the life-cycle theory is violated. Similar assumptions have 
been made by Carroll and Summers (1987). 
To most people immediate consumption is regarded as an attractive alternative 
to future saving even though the latter would be economically rational. The 
behavioral life-cycle theory also postulates that people use various devices and 
heuristic rules to deal with the difficulties of postponing wealth until later in life. 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992) assumed a structure of preference in two parts as 
a model of how the internal conflict between rational and emotional aspects are 
handled. People are supposed to act on the basis of the existence of two inconsis- 
tent preferences. One is long-term and rational while the other is short-term and 
impulsive. They are referred to as the planner and the doer. The planner is directed 
towards the maximization of life-long utility which implies a reduction of current 
consumption. The task of the doer, in contrast, is to maximize utility by immedi- 
ate consumption. 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992) found support of their theory in that the pro- 
pensity to consume a windfall of $2400 was greater when it came in increments of 
$200 per month (current spendable income account or I) than when it came in a 
lump sum (current assets account or A) and in that it was smallest when the 
$2,400 was payable in the future (future income account or F). In a student sample 
the median consumption expenditures were $1,200, $785, and $0, respectively. 
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One aim with the present study was to attempt o replicate this result. To make it 
possible to assess whether Shefrin and Thaler’s results are generally valid, both a 
student sample and a representative nationwide sample were used. These samples 
answered questionnaire questions similar to those used by Shefrin and Thaler. 
In the study by Shefrin and Thaler (1988), the current asset account was distin- 
guished from the current spendable income account solely on the basis of how the 
money was obtained (immediately as a lump sum, incrementally per month, or as 
a delayed lump sum). However, it seems possible that some alternative explana- 
tion is viable. In fact, many theories have been proposed to explain why people in 
intertemporal choice are unable to choose greater comfort in the long run over a 
smaller comfort in the short run. It has been suggested by Ainslie (1975, 1982, 
1986) that preferences will reverse as a function of the time at which they are 
made, relative to the time the rewards are available. This can be illustrated by con- 
sidering two rewards, one smaller which would be received at tt and one larger 
which would be received at t2. The first represents the temptation whereas the sec- 
ond represents some greater reward that would be received further in the future. If 
the choice is made between the two well in advance, the utility of the second 
reward is higher. As the time is approached at which the first award is available, 
its temptation increases so that its utility surpasses that of the later award. 
Ainslie (1975, 1982, 1986) explains violations of delay-independence in terms 
of the steepness of a function which discounts the utility of a reward. In addition, 
it has been suggested by Loewenstein (1987) that this steepness is related to sev- 
eral emotional factors which are involved in decisions over time. For instance, 
when looking forward to pleasant outcomes, we experience what Loewenstein 
calls “savoring.” This emotion is positive, like the experience of the outcome 
itself. The emotional counterpart for negative outcomes is labeled “dread.” 
According to Loewenstein, some of our emotions are caused by expectations 
about outcomes, and people have goals concerning these emotions as well as con- 
cerning the outcomes themselves. 
According to Shefrin and Thaler (1988), saving is supposed to increase if the 
income is framed in terms of a yearly bonus, as opposed to if it is spread out all 
over the year. Another prediction can be made from the notion of discounting in 
intertemporal choice. Here, people are assumed to consume a yearly bonus if it is 
obtained immediately but not if it is obtained in the future. If it is spread out 
monthly, people should be less inclined to consume it as compared to if it is paid 
immediately but more inclined than if it is paid in the future. 
In prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 
1992) utility is assigned to changes from a reference point which may be the status 
quo. Building on this theory, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) assumed that the ref- 
erence point is sensitive to the wording of the questions that elicit intertemporal 
tradeoffs. Therefore, they suggest a gain-loss asymmetry for intertemporal 
choices. They suggest that losses are discounted at a lower rate than gains. It has 
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for instance been shown by Loewenstein (1988) that subjects, on average, are 
indifferent between receiving $10 immediately and receiving $2 1 in one year, and 
also between losing $10 immediately and losing $15 in one year. The correspond- 
ing figures for $100 were $157 for gains and $133 for losses. Dramatic loss/gain 
asymmetries have similarly been reported by Thaler (1980, 1992). 
Fischer’s (1930) formalization of discounted utility suggests that there should 
be no difference between a speed-up or a delay of consumption, Accordingly, the 
discount rates estimated from expediting and delaying gains should be equal and 
higher than the rates estimated from expediting and delaying losses. However, it 
was shown by Thaler (1980) that subjects actually may exhibit negative discount- 
ing, in that they preferred an immediate loss over a delayed loss of equal value. 
Hence, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) predicted that discount rates should be 
high for expediting a loss and delaying a gain, and lower for expediting a gain and 
delaying a loss. This prediction gained empirical support (see also Benzion, Rapa- 
port, & Yagil, 1989). In addition, building on empirical results (Thaler, 1980; 
Benzion, Rapaport, & Yagil, 1989) Loewenstein and Prelec claimed that the gain- 
loss asymmetry should be most pronounced for small outcomes. 
In a recent study, two versions of a task were accordingly presented to two groups 
of students (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). The choice options consisted of install- 
ment plans for a TV. In both versions respondents (a) had to choose between two 
alternatives which involved an initial and a later payment, (b) were informed that the 
initial payment was higher in one of the options whereas the overall payment was 
higher in the other, and (c) were presented with the same payoffs and delivery times. 
However, in one of the versions the initial and later payments were framed in terms 
of their actual values whereas they were expressed in terms of rebates subtracted 
from a higher price level in the other version. According to the predictions of Fis- 
cher’s (1930) model, there would be no systematic differences in the responses to 
the two versions. Nevertheless, a higher fraction of respondents opted for the lower- 
discount option (the one involving greater earlier payments) when the question was 
framed as a loss rather than as a gain (rebates). Loewenstein and Prelec explained 
this by suggesting that in the first frame, the large negative outcomes suffered less 
discounting, which caused people to decide on the basis of total payments. In the 
second frame the smaller and positive values of the rebates contributed to a rela- 
tively high discounting of the delayed outcomes, leading to a preference for the 
option which offered a greater initial rebate. 
A new feature of the present study is that the questions asked by Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988) were repeated for income decreases. It is not clear what predictions 
the behavioral life-cycle theory would make in this case. In accordance with the 
results of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) it is predicted that the propensity to cut 
down on consumption when facing an income decrease (monetary loss) should be 
less when it comes in decrements per month (I) than when it comes immediately 
in a lump sum (A). The propensity to cut down on consumption is also expected to 
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be less when it comes as a future lump sum (F) than when it comes in decrements 
per month. Thus, people should adjust the least to future outcomes. 
In line with Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), it is further assumed that choices to 
consume are influenced by the discount rates which should be high for expediting 
a loss and delaying a gain, while lower for expediting a gain and delaying a loss. It 
has been pointed out by Shelley (1993,1994) that this asy~e~ cannot be attrib- 
uted to outcome sign alone and that also the direction of change in outcome timing 
may be important for the effect. Due to the fact that discount rates are supposed to 
be low for both expediting a gain and delaying a loss, the adjustment should be higher 
for losses than for gains in the delayed scenarios, that is, when the gain/loss will occur 
in the future. The adjustment should on the other hand be higher for gains than for 
losses when the gain/loss is immediate, that is, if the income change comes in a lump 
sum. This gives two predictions: (a) The fact that delayed bad outcomes have lower 
discount rates than delayed good outcomes implies that people will adjust more to 
the values of bad future outcomes than to the values of good future outcomes; (b) 
The fact that immediate good outcomes have lower discount rates than immediate 
bad outcomes implies that people will adjust more to the values of good immediate 
outcomes than to the values of bad immediate outcomes. 
A gain/loss asymmetry has also been reported implying that the balance 
between gain and loss outcomes is different for immediate than for future events 
(Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). Loss aversion implies that losses loom larger than 
gains (K~nern~ & Tversky, 1979). In the present context, both on the basis of 
the gain/loss asymmetry and loss aversion, it is predicted that people will to a 
larger extent cut down on consumption if facing an income decrease than they are 
willing to raise it if facing an income increase of the same amount. 
Studying the impact on consumption of both income increases and decreases in 
relation to the use of mental accounts may be illu~nating. In particular it may 
show that the discounting notion is more general and may account for effects of 
both income increase and decrease. The predictions are thus that consumption is 
more likely after an immediate rather than an incremental income increase and 
more likely after an incremental than after a delayed income increase. However, 
in the case of an income decrease, consumption is foregone when it is immediate 
rather than decremental and foregone when it is delayed rather than decremental. 
On the basis of the notion of mental accounts, the behavioral life-cycle theory in 
contrast predicts that willingness to consume is weakest for a future income 
increase and strongest for an incremental income increase. Still, no clear predic- 
tions seem to follow for income decreases. 
METHOD 
In order to test the predictions two mail-back surveys were conducted. One survey 
was made of a nationwide random sample of 2,000 individuals between 18 and 65 
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years old. A second survey was made of a sample consisting of 480 randomly 
selected undergraduate students at Gijteborg University. 
In line with standard procedures of the Central Bureau of Statistics of Sweden, 
two similar questionnaires were constructed for the surveys. The questionnaires 
included both a module with sociodemographic questions and a module which 
was designed for hypothesis testing. The only difference between the two versions 
was that questions about educational background were more elaborate in the ver- 
sion mailed to the representative households. 
Based on the survey carried out by Shefrin and Thaler (1988), three questions 
were designed to be account specific (I, A, F) (see Appendix). These questions 
were framed both as increases and decreases. For income increases, each question 
asked the respondents to estimate the marginal propensity to consume out of an 
income increase which either was SEK 12,000 ($1,700) or SEK 6,000 ($850). The 
three account specific versions differed in how the distribution of the income 
increase was framed, in terms of when it was distributed and in how large it was. 
In relation to each version, two questions requested respondents to estimate their 
consumption propensity for the next month and for the following 11 months, 
respectively. Participants were presented with three options: (a) to estimate the 
amount which exceeded the usual degree of consumption; (b) to estimate the 
amount which fell behind the usual degree of consumption; or (c) to indicate an 
unchanged degree of consumption. 
The income decrease questions asked the respondents to estimate the propen- 
sity to cut down on their consumption. The decrease was either SEK 6,000 ($850) 
or SEK 3,000 ($425).’ The participants were asked the same questions about their 
propensity to consume the next month and the following 11 months, respectively. 
The choice options were also the same. 
Income change and amount were treated as between-subjects factors, 
whereas type of question, or account, was treated as a within-subject factor. 
This means that all respondents answered the three questions tapping different 
accounts. Moreover, an approximately equal number of respondents in different 
subgroups answered the questions for income increases or decreases. Similar- 
ily, questions involving different amounts were answered by diffferent 
subgroups. 
Initially, the respondents in each sample received a questionnaire with a letter 
explaining the purpose of the study. Three days later reminders were mailed to all 
members of the samples. Two weeks later new reminders were mailed to nonre- 
spondents including a new copy of the questionnaire. Those who received this 
second reminder were also offered compensation in the form of a lottery ticket 
worth $3. Still another two weeks later, nonrespondents were contacted by tele- 
phone and again reminded. A new questionnaire was sent to those who agreed to 
respond. 
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RESULTS 
The data sets consisted of usable responses from 50% of the nationwide sample 
(996 respondents) and 58% of the student sample (277 respondents). Analyses 
indicated that the missing respondents did not systematically differ from those 
who responded. The participants who responded after two reminders did not differ 
reliably with respect to age, gender, and income ch~acte~stics from those who 
responded immediately or after one reminder. In the nationwide sample, partici- 
pants and nonparticipants did not differ much with respect to age (4 1.1 years and 
41.3 years, respectively). A t-test confirmed that this difference was not signifi- 
cant, t(1983) = .4O,p = 55. Regarding the gender distribution 50.5% were men and 
49.5% were women, whereas the co~esponding figures for nonp~icipants were 
48.8% and 51.2%. These proportions did not differ from chance (x2 = .57, 
p < .45). The mean income level reported by participants was $21,800 ($25,700 
for males and $17,570 for females) which is close to the nationwide average. 
Tests were made of how actual income and asset position influenced the pro- 
pensity to adjust to income changes 2 in the nationwide sample. An ANOVA 
revealed that account interacted neither with actual income nor asset position. In 
fact, the respondents’ propensities to consume showed the same account-specific 
rank order independent of socio-economic status (actual income x asset position). 
However, separate one-way ANOVAs revealed reliable effects for both income 
position, F(2, 751) = 8.76, p < .OOOl, and asset position, F(2, 491) = 10.82, 
p < .OOOl. Thus, respondents with low income and little assets to a higher extent 
adjusted to income changes. 
The estimates of total consumption was calculated for each subject and condi- 
tion according to the equation 11X + Z, where X denotes the estimate for the next 
month and 2 the estimate for each of the following 11 months. In line with the 
results of Winnett and Lewis (1995), it was found in the nationwide sample that a 
large proportion of respondents from both samples reported that they would not 
change their consumption. In the income increase condition 4 1.7% of the respon- 
dents indicated that they would increase consumption, 58% that they would not 
change it, and 0.3% that they would decrease it. In the income decrease condition 
67% indicated that they would decrease consumption, 32% that they would not 
change it, and 1% that they would increase it. Hence, because of the positively 
and negatively skewed distributions, the estimates were recoded as increases or 
decreases of consumption. If a respondent revealed a total increase this was coded 
as 1, whereas a total decrease was coded as -1. If the respondent on the other hand 
had chosen not to change in both questions, this was coded as 0. In the income- 
decrease condition the signs were reversed. 
The mean proportions of adjustments are given in Table 1 for each income 
change condition and sample. As may be seen, in both samples the respondents 
were most willing to change their propensity to consume if an income increase 
came in a lump sum (A) and not in increments per month (1).3 Furthermore, the 
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respondents were least willing to consume when the income increase came in a 
future lump sum (F). The results were different for an income decrease: In both 
samples respondents were less willing to forego consumption when the income 
decrease came in decrements and most willing when it came in a future or imme- 
diate lump sum. A sample (2) by income change (2) by account (3) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor showed that the 
interaction between income change and account was significant, 1;(2, 2118) = 
125.67, p c .OOOl. In addition, adjustments were larger for an income decrease 
than an income increase, as subst~tiated by a reliable main effect of income 
change, F(1, 1059) = 59.61, p c .OOOl. It was also larger in the student sample 
than in the nationwide sample, F(1, 1059) = 29.84, p -e .OOOl. In addition, there 
was a significant interaction between sample and account, F( 1, 1059) = 5.31, 
p < .05, indicating that students were more willing to adjust to a future lump sum 
than respondents in the nationwide sample. 
DISCUSSION 
The behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992) assumes that peo- 
ple use mental accounts to be able to postpone consumption until later in life. An 
impo~ant implication is that the propensity to consume an income increase should 
be greater when it comes in increments per month than when it comes in a lump 
sum, and that it should be smallest when it is expected as a future lump sum. She- 
frin and Thaler received support for this implication in a sample survey of stu- 
dents. The results of the present study were different. Both a student sample and a 
nationwide sample showed that willingness to cons~e was stated to be higher 
when respondents imagined that an income increase would be received immedi- 
ately as a lump sum. This outcome was predicted from theories of intertemporal 
choice (Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) which assume that 
future outcomes are positively discounted. Consistent both with the predictions 
from the behavioral life-cycle theory and theories of inte~emporal choice, respon- 
dents were least willing to consume when they imagined they would receive an 
income increase as a future lump sum. 
In the present study, an extension of Shefrin and Thaler’s results (1988) was 
made in that the consumption questions were also asked for income decreases. In 
this case it is unclear whether the behavioral life-cycle theory makes any definite 
predictions. From theories of intertemporal choice (Loewenstein, 1987; Loewen- 
stein & Prelec, 1992), it was predicted that consumption would be forgone more 
after an immediate income decrease than after a decremental income decrease. 
The results were consistent with this prediction. However, they also showed that a 
decremental income decrease did not differ from a future income decrease which 
came in a lump sum. This may be interpreted in line with other recent findings 
indicating that losses are not as heavily discounted as gains (e.g., Loewenstein, 
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Table 1. Mean Proportions of Adjustments to Income Changes in the 
Nationwide and Student Sample Related to Income Change and Mental Account 
Nationwide Sample Student Sample 
income increase 
$1,70O/year 
Current spendable income (I) 
Current assets (A) 
Future income (F) 
$850/year 
Current spendable income (1) 
Current assets (A) 
Future income (F) 
hcome decrease 
$850/year 
Current spendable income (I) 
Current assets (A) 
Future income (F) 
$425/year 
Current spendable income (I) 
Current assets (A) 













1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Thaler, 1980). Nevertheless, the idea of men- 
tal accounting was supported by the fact, that there were no interactions between 
account and actual income. For instance, the respondents’ propensities to con- 
sume showed the same account-specific rank order independent of socio- 
economic status. 
Another prediction which was borne out was that in both samples adjustments 
were greater to income decreases than to income increases. This was predicted 
both from the gain/loss asymmetry which suggests that gains are discounted more 
heavily than losses (e.g., Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) and 
from loss aversion which implies that losses are weighted more heavily than gains 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). It should be 
noted that the asymmetry was observed even though the absolute amount of the 
income decrease was higher than the amount of the income increase, consistent 
with the value function in prospect theory (see note 1). Thus, the observed asym- 
metry was probably not accounted for by loss aversion alone. 
It is also noteworthy that the respondents seemed most willing to adapt to the 
values of the loss outcomes in both the delayed and the immediate scenario 
(equivalent to the F and A accounts), although this tendency was clearest in the 
former case. These results support the prediction that (a) delayed losses have 
lower discount rates than delayed gains, but violate the prediction that (b) imme- 
diate gains have lower discount rates than immediate losses (both predictions 
from Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). They hereby underline that loss aversion is a 
salient feature of intertemporal choice. 
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In general, the results were very similar for the student sample and the repre- 
sentative nationwide sample. A difference was that the students were more willing 
to adjust to an income change, and in particular to an income increase. A possible 
explanation is that consumption is more attractive to students who in general con- 
sume less than the average consumer. 
In conclusion, the results failed to completely replicate the results of Shefrin 
and Thaler (1988). It also showed that the respondents act differently when con- 
sumption questions are asked in the context of income decreases. It is suggested 
that theories of intertemporal choice (Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1992) in some respects could explain the results better than the behavioral life- 
cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988, 1992). This suggests that although people 
use mental accounting in everyday life, the phenomenon is in need of a more thor- 
ough analysis concerning its properties and functions (Henderson & Peterson, 
1992; Ranyard, 1995). 
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Appendix. Q ues Ions and Response Options used in the Quetsionnaire t’ 
Hypothesis-testing questions for income increase 
1. (I) You have received a permanent income increase through your work to the amount of $142 per 
month after taxation. 
2. (A) You have received a temporary income increase through your work to the amount of $1,700 after 
taxation. It will be paid in a lump sum this month. 
3. (F) You have received a temporary income increase through your work to the amount of $1,700 after 
taxation. It will be paid in a lump sum in 12 months, and will until then be placed in an interest bearing 
account. 
Hypothesis-testmg questions for Income decrease 
1. (I) You have received a permanent income decrease through your work to the amount of $71 per month 
after tdxation. 
2. (A) You havr received a temporary income decrease through your work to the amount of $850 after 
taxation. It will be deducted as a lump sum this month. 
3. (F) You have ret-eived a temporary income dec-rease through your work to the amount of $850 after 
taxation. It will be dctlucted with intrrest as a lump burn in 12 months. 
Questions and response opt~onc for boih types of ux-omc hngc~ 
Do you think that during the next month you will consume: 
$ morr than Ural 
$ less than usual 
16 As much as usual 
Do you think that during the following 11 months you will ccjnsume: 
$ more per month than usual 
$ le\s per month than usual 
$ As much as usual 
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NOTES 
I. Since the value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahne- 
man, 1991, 1992) is approximately twice as steep for losses than for gains, the amounts in the 
decrease condition would render the value about equal. 
2. If a respondent’s annual income fell below $17,000, it was categorized as low; if it ranged 
between $17,000 and $34,000, as moderate; and if it exceeded $34,000, as high. The reported 
asset positions were categorized in a similar way: If the reported asset position of a respondent 
fell below $7,000, it was categorized as low; If it ranged between $7,000 and $28,500 as moder- 
ate, and if it exceeded $28,500 as high. 
3. If the data for the student sample had been aggregated as medians as Shefrin and Thaler (1988) 
did, the results would have been similar in the income-increase condition. This was, however, 
not true for the representative sample. 
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